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Abstract
Many tasks aim to measure MACHINE READ-
ING COMPREHENSION (MRC), often focus-
ing on question types presumed to be diffi-
cult. Rarely, however, do task designers start
by considering what systems should in fact
comprehend. In this paper we make two key
contributions. First, we argue that existing
approaches do not adequately define compre-
hension; they are too unsystematic about what
content is tested. Second, we present a de-
tailed definition of comprehension—a TEM-
PLATE OF UNDERSTANDING—for a widely
useful class of texts, namely short narratives.
We then conduct an experiment that strongly
suggests existing systems are not up to the task
of narrative understanding as we define it.
1 Introduction
Over the past few years, neural models (e.g., Chen
et al., 2016; Devlin et al., 2019; Liu et al., 2019)
have begun to match or even exceed human per-
formance on MACHINE READING COMPREHEN-
SION (MRC) benchmarks. In these tasks, systems
demonstrate their comprehension of a passage by
answering questions about it. Yet despite recent
successes, MRC appears far from solved: systems
continue to make trivial, sometimes baffling mis-
takes, and they fail to generalize to new data. Such
shortcomings have motivated a flurry of new MRC
tasks, each designed to confront systems with ques-
tions deemed challenging for current methods. For
example, tasks may ask questions requiring com-
monsense reasoning (Huang et al., 2019), multi-
hop reasoning (Welbl et al., 2018), or inferences
based on a second passage (Lin et al., 2019).
This line of research assumes that ever-more-
“difficult” question-answering tasks will ultimately
lead to more robust and useful reading comprehen-
sion. We argue that, while the question-answering
*Equal contributions.
format can be a fine choice for how to test com-
prehension, using difficulty as the basis for what
to test is fundamentally flawed. To put it provoca-
tively, the dominant MRC research paradigm is like
trying to become a professional sprinter by glanc-
ing around the gym and adopting any exercises
that look hard. The training may end up exercising
some relevant muscles, but it is far too haphazard
to achieve the ultimate goal.
Like athletic training, MRC tasks are not an end
in themselves; ultimately, they are meant to lead to
real-world applications. Current tasks may suffice
for sufficiently similar applications—e.g., chatbots
that look up customer questions in product docu-
mentation. But many proposed NLP applications
hinge on deeper comprehension. Early work (e.g.,
Dyer, 1982) pointed to examples like assistance
with legal disputes and service contracts; more re-
cent work suggests applications such as summariz-
ing a patient’s clinical timeline (Jung et al., 2011).
For such complex applications, machines will need
to manipulate rich models of the world evoked by
the text—e.g., to compare a claimant’s narrative
to legal standards, or to build a causal model of a
patient’s condition. From this broader perspective,
the current paradigm falls short.
Specifically, we claim that in the quest for dif-
ficulty, task designers overlook the issue of what
content—what information expressed, implied, or
relied on by the passage—systems should compre-
hend. MRC datasets are usually constructed by
having humans cast about for supposedly tricky
questions, most often questions based on reasoning.
But the questions that result are scattershot, offer-
ing little assurance that even a high-scoring system
has achieved a useful and robust understanding.
We advocate for a different approach. We pro-
pose that the first step in defining MRC tasks should
be specifying what content a system would likely
need to understand for a given class of applica-
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tions. Only then can tasks systematically compile
questions to probe for the internal model that the
machine ought to have constructed.
This paper demonstrates such an approach for
applications that involve understanding narratives.1
After reviewing existing approaches to construct-
ing MRC datasets (§2), we argue for narratives
as a valuable MRC testbed (§3.1). Then, inspired
by cognitive science research on reading compre-
hension, we propose a “template of understanding”
(ToU) for stories—an account of what an internal
model of a story should minimally contain (§3.2).
We also suggest ways to operationalize our ToU as
a story comprehension task (§4). Finally, we show
evidence from a pilot ToU-based task that current
MRC models are not up to the challenge (§5).
2 Existing MRC dataset designs
This paper addresses how MRC tests can be made
more systematic. Accordingly, we review existing
tasks grouped by their data collection methods. We
argue that each category falls short of testing a
useful body of content in a satisfying way.
2.1 Manually written questions
By far the most popular strategy for generating
MRC questions is to have humans—usually crowd
workers, but sometimes trained annotators—think
of questions about each passage.
The most straightforward version of this method
gives annotators little to no guidance regarding
what questions to ask. One early example is the
TREC-8 dataset (Voorhees and Tice, 2000). In
the more recent SNLI (Bowman et al., 2015) and
MNLI (Williams et al., 2018) entailment tasks,
the only constraint on crowd workers was that
they produce one entailed, one contradicted, and
one neutral hypothesis for each premise sentence.2
Similarly, the workers who assembled NewsQA
(Trischler et al., 2017) were told only that the ques-
tions had to be answerable with short phrases, and
workers for SQuAD (Rajpurkar et al., 2016) were
simply given a “good” and a “bad” example and
encouraged to use original wording.
1We will use “narrative” and “story” interchangeably,
roughly following the Wikipedia definition: “A narrative or
story is an account of a series of related events, experiences,
or the like, whether true. . . or fictitious.”
2Parts of the original RTE datasets (Dagan et al., 2006, etc.)
were generated more systematically, but only in the sense that
the outputs of NLP tools (e.g., translation or information ex-
traction systems) were recorded as correct/incorrect examples
of entailment. Little attention was paid to subject matter.
The problem with such an open-ended genera-
tion process is that, absent stronger guidance, peo-
ple tend to write simple questions that can be an-
swered using lexical cues. (See, e.g., the dataset
analysis in Rajpurkar et al., 2016.) This makes the
tasks questionable measures of comprehension.
The dominant solution is to incorporate trick-
ier twists. NarrativeQA (Kocˇisky´ et al., 2018) and
DuoRC (Saha et al., 2018) reduce lexical similar-
ity between questions and passages by showing
annotators only a second passage about the same
events. Other datasets emphasize reasoning pre-
sumed to be difficult, such as incorporating infor-
mation from multiple parts of the text. MCTest
(Richardson et al., 2013) and MultiRC (Khashabi
et al., 2018) ask for questions that rely on multi-
ple sentences; ROPES (Lin et al., 2019) has an-
notators apply information from one passage to
write questions on a second; and HotpotQA (Yang
et al., 2018b) and QASC (Khot et al., 2019) re-
quire multi-hop reasoning. Other forms of reason-
ing tested include coreference resolution (Quoref,
Dasigi et al., 2019; Winograd Schema Challange,
Levesque et al., 2012), numerical reasoning (DROP,
Dua et al., 2019), and commonsense reasoning
(Cosmos QA, Huang et al., 2019). Tasks can also
be made harder with devices such as unanswer-
able questions (SQuADRUn, Rajpurkar et al., 2018;
NewsQA; CosmosQA) and filtering questions with
an adversarial baseline (DROP; Quoref; QASC).
These twists do make MRC harder. But to pursue
hard questions is to overlook why easy questions
seemed inadequate in the first place: MRC tasks are
a means to an end, namely useful applications, and
easy questions—e.g., questions that depend only
on lexical cues—do not suffice for that end. The
techniques above may help by guiding annotators
to a different space of questions: intuition suggests
that some of these harder questions are indeed use-
ful ones. But such techniques are an incomplete
solution, as difficulty is a weak proxy for utility.
What matters is not the system’s sophistication per
se; it is the alignment between the questions the
system can answer and the ones a given application
needs it to. Designing for difficulty still gives little
assurance of such alignment.
Perhaps a truly random walk through question
space would eventually cover a representative set of
useful questions, but annotators are biased toward
questions that humans find interesting (see Gordon
and Van Durme, 2013; Misra et al., 2016; Zhang
et al., 2017). They do not think to ask questions
whose answers seem obvious, even when those an-
swers are essential to comprehension. If we do not
delineate such facts and evaluate systems’ ability
to manipulate them, we will never be satisfied that
the systems have adequately understood the text.
2.2 Naturally occurring questions
A second approach is to find questions “in the
wild,” then retrospectively collect documents con-
taining the answers. This is the approach of BoolQ
(Clark et al., 2019) and MS MARCO (Nguyen et al.,
2016), which compile search engine queries, and of
ELI5 (Fan et al., 2019), which harvests questions
from Reddit’s “Explain Like I’m Five” forum.
Such datasets are clearly useful for answering
common queries, a valuable application class in its
own right. For more complex applications, how-
ever, common queries are, if anything, less thor-
ough than annotators at probing important elements
of understanding (particularly aspects humans find
obvious). The mismatch between questions and
passage content is exacerbated by finding the pas-
sages retrospectively: the questions do not even
attempt to test most of what each passage discusses,
making them an insufficient measure of MRC.
2.3 Questions from tests designed for humans
The third strategy is to pull questions from tests
written for humans. Examples include the early
“Deep Read” corpus (Hirschman et al., 1999); the
more recent TriviaQA (Joshi et al., 2017) and
SearchQA (Dunn et al., 2017) datasets, which mine
collections of trivia questions; the AI2 Reason-
ing Challenge (ARC; Clark et al., 2018), which
asks questions from standardized science tests; and
RACE (Lai et al., 2017), which draws from English
learning materials for Chinese school students.
Our chief concern about this approach echoes
our concerns from §2.1: tests designed for humans
rarely bother to test content that most humans find
obvious. Accordingly, they gloss over vast swaths
of understanding that machines do not yet have but
which may be critical to applications. In addition,
SearchQA, TriviaQA, and ARC find passages ret-
rospectively, so again, the questions they ask only
tangentially graze the content of each passage.
2.4 Automatically generated questions
Several projects generate questions algorithmically.
The CNN/Daily Mail datasets (Hermann et al.,
2015) and ReCoRD (Zhang et al., 2018) produce
cloze-style questions over news passages by mask-
ing out entities from summaries and below-the-fold
sentences. ComplexWebQuestions (CWQ; Talmor
and Berant, 2018) and WikiHop (Welbl et al., 2018)
test for multi-hop reasoning by walking a struc-
tured knowledge base. Finally, bAbI (Weston et al.,
2016) generates short texts and questions from a
simple simulation of characters moving around.
Each algorithm encodes assumptions about what
is worth asking. In theory, then, the algorithmic ap-
proach could produce a satisfying MRC test: given
appropriate inputs, the algorithm could aim to gen-
erate questions that cover important content. In-
deed, our proposal in §4.1 can be seen as a question
generation algorithm to be run by humans.
In practice, however, algorithmic approaches
have de-emphasized content. CNN/Daily Mail and
ReCoRD capture explicit assertions about mask-
able entities, which do not amount to a principled
body of content. The algorithms behind CWQ and
WikiHop at least take as input some body of con-
tent, namely knowledge graphs. But the graphs
include only a fraction—again, not a principled
one—of the associated documents’ content, and
the questions are further restricted to rely on multi-
hop reasoning. Multi-hop reasoning is no doubt
a major error source for MRC, but applications
are driven by what propositions must be extracted;
whether each proposition takes zero inference steps
or seven is immaterial. Accordingly, multi-hop
questions are worth investigating, but they are not
a sufficiently well-motivated body of content to
constitute a measure of reading comprehension.
Similar remarks can be made about most of
bAbI’s 20 “tasks”: grounded in simulations, their
question generation algorithms start from known
content, but target forms of reasoning. However,
the tasks concerning time, positions, sizes, pathfind-
ing, and motivations are closer to our content-first
question generation strategy. These tasks are not
driven by applications, and their synthetic pas-
sages are unrealistically simple, but among existing
datasets, they are closest to our proposal.
2.5 Summary: What is missing
The most clear-cut way to test reading comprehen-
sion would be to select passages, describe what
should be comprehended from them, and design
tests for that understanding. Yet few MRC datasets
have even approximated this approach. Many im-
pose little structure on what content is tested; the
rest pick some “difficult” form(s) of analysis or lin-
guistic phenomena, but rarely consider downstream
goals to determine what the questions should be
about. Metrics for difficult reasoning and linguis-
tic phenomena (see, e.g., Gardner et al., 2019) are
useful, but only as tools for error analysis and miti-
gation; they are not top-line performance metrics.
In addition, many datasets to date suffer from
two other problems: 1) they select passages after
the questions are asked, meaning the questions test
comprehension of only small portions of the pas-
sages; and/or 2) they ask very few questions whose
answers are obvious to humans.
These issues of content scope also intersect with
issues of format. Many tasks have adopted a span
extraction format, including TREC QA, NewsQA,
and (most notably) SQuAD and its successors. This
format immediately rules out questions about in-
ferred events or entities, which may be essential to
a complete interpretation.The main alternative is
multiple choice (MC), used in tasks such as Cos-
mos QA, RACE, ARC, WikiHop, and every task
in GLUE (Wang et al., 2019b) and SuperGLUE
(Wang et al., 2019a). But MC has its own problem
of providing extra hints via answer choices.
We will return to the format issue in §4. But
first, we propose a more systematic approach to
constructing MRC datasets.
3 Defining deep story understanding
Our approach starts from the content of a passage,
which we define as the information it expresses,
implies, or relies on. Specifically, we propose that
task designers lay out a minimal body of content
that MRC systems should demonstrate they under-
stand. Exactly what that content is will vary from
passage to passage, of course, but the key is to de-
fine a TEMPLATE OF UNDERSTANDING (ToU): a
set of question templates that can be filled in with
specific events and entities for any given passage.
The answers to the fleshed-out questions will con-
stitute a floor of understanding for the passage—a
plausible lower bound on what content machines
ought to comprehend.
The natural next question is what content the
ToU should cover. System needs will vary by appli-
cation. To advance MRC writ large without limit-
ing ourselves to a single application, we propose se-
lecting a class of texts where one could reasonably
predict a priori what content would be useful for
applications. In the rest of this section, we endorse
fictional narratives as a particularly promising class
of texts and propose a ToU for them.3
3.1 The case for stories
Stories have several convenient properties that rec-
ommend them as a testbed for MRC.
Most importantly, applications that involve com-
prehending stories are numerous and diverse. Con-
sider a legal aid tool: to assess whether a lawsuit
may be warranted, it would have to comprehend an
account of the events in question. Likewise, a tool
that finds candidates for medical trials would need
to read each patient history. (Appendix A fleshes
out these scenarios.) These examples are not excep-
tional; applications in other domains will depend
on stories in customer complaints, intelligence dis-
patches, financial news, and many other document
types. Humans tend to think and communicate
in terms of stories (see, e.g., Haidt, 2013; Mateas
and Sengers, 1999; Bruner, 1991; Eck, 2006), so
it is unsurprising that stories are ubiquitous in the
content we want NLU tools to help us with.
Additionally, stories come with a strong prior
from cognitive science about what elements of un-
derstanding will be useful. Research on human
reading comprehension (e.g., Graesser et al., 1994;
Zwaan et al., 1995) suggests that humans attend
primarily to the timeline of events, to the locations
of entities and events, and to the causes and mo-
tivations of events and actions. For applications
that involve story comprehension, we can expect
that machines will need to understand these same
dimensions. We can thus design a principled ToU
for stories even without specifying an application.
Stories’ content also makes them a particularly
compelling demonstration of understanding, for
two reasons. First, cognitive science suggests that
humans make more inferences when reading narra-
tive text than expository text (Graesser et al., 1994).
In particular, a story entails a highly structured net-
work of relations (timelines, causality, etc.). Thus,
stories do exercise abilities beyond simple factoid
extraction. Second, stories rely on a large body of
implicit world knowledge. If a system is able to use
and express that knowledge when reading stories,
it will likely be able to apply the same knowledge
even when comprehending other kinds of texts.
Among stories, fictional ones offer the strongest
test of comprehension: their contents cannot be
3To be clear, we are not claiming that fictional narratives
are themselves an application; only that they are a class of
texts that are useful for many applications.
found in corpora, so systems must rely on compre-
hending the text (Richardson et al., 2013). Accord-
ingly, we suggest using fictional narratives as the
basis for developing a ToU and evaluating MRC.
3.2 A ToU for stories
We propose four overlapping clusters of questions
for story comprehension, corresponding to the four
elements identified by Zwaan et al. (1995) as the
ones humans attend to when reading stories. Fur-
ther support for these questions, particularly the
last two, comes from early work in computational
story understanding: Schank and Abelson (1977)
identify causal chains, plans and goals as crucial
elements of understanding multi-sentence stories.
1. Spatial: Where are entities positioned over
time, relative to landmarks and each other?
How are they physically oriented? And where
do events take place?
2. Temporal: What events and sub-events occur,
and in what order? Also, for what blocks of
that timeline do entities’ states hold true?
3. Causal: How do events and states lead mech-
anistically to the events and states described
or implied by the text?
4. Motivational: How do agents’ beliefs, de-
sires, and emotions lead to their actions?
These question templates form the ToU. Systems
should ideally be able to answer them about all en-
tities and events that the story mentions or implies
(though of course some entities/events are more
important than others; see §4.1). We do not have
a separate category for “who did what to whom”
information, but we expect strong performance on
the ToU to hinge on such analysis. In particular,
much of this information is captured in the charac-
terization of events for temporal questions.
Of course, these four facets do not cover every-
thing one might comprehend. They include noth-
ing about the story’s message, or how it resembles
other stories, or even most counting questions. The
ToU merely provides a lower bound on what is
needed. That said, many forms of reasoning (e.g.,
counting) can be reduced to deterministically ma-
nipulating the answers to multiple ToU questions.
4 Towards a story understanding task
Our ToU provides a conceptual framework for stat-
ing what a machine should understand from a story.
Spatial (sample entries):
• Rover is in the yard from when he runs out the door
until he runs inside.
• Rover is in the house from when he runs inside until
the end of the story.
Temporal (sample entries):
• Allie arrives just before Rover runs outside.
• Rover barks just before he runs inside.
• It is still raining at the end of the story.
Motivational (sample entry):
• Rover runs inside, rather than staying put, because:
– If he runs inside, he will be inside, whereas if he
does not he will be outside, because:
* Rover is outside.
* Running to a place results in being there.
– If Rover is inside, he will not get rained on,
whereas if he is outside he will, because:
* It is raining.
* When it is raining, things that are outside tend
to get rained on, whereas things inside do not.
– Rover would prefer not getting rained on to get-
ting rained on, because:
* Most dogs prefer not to get rained on.
Figure 1: A partial RoU for the following simple story
fragment: . . . One day, it was raining. When Allie ar-
rived, Rover ran out the door. He barked when he felt
the rain. He ran right back inside.
However, there remains the challenge of opera-
tionalizing the framework—i.e., of rigorously as-
sessing whether a machine has that understanding.
We do not claim to have solved this problem,
but in this section we discuss two broad directions
for further development: evaluating based on an-
notated answers to ToU questions and asking un-
trained humans to rank different answers. These
approaches might even be combined to offer com-
plementary perspectives on system performance.
4.1 Approach 1: Annotating ToU answers
One class of approaches starts with trained anno-
tators writing plain-English answers to each ToU
question. The annotators are given guidelines for
instantiating the ToU on new stories and for making
answers detailed and thorough. We call an anno-
tator’s answer document a RECORD OF UNDER-
STANDING (RoU); see Figure 1 for an example.
Conceptually, answering temporal and spatial
questions is straightforward, but the causal and mo-
tivational questions require more definition. People
accept many kinds of answers to such questions. It
is therefore important to clarify what a good answer
should include—i.e., what causal or motivational
facts an MRC system should comprehend.
We base our account of these questions on the
philosophical literature on causality (see Schaffer,
2016) and on the social science literature on what
explanations people seek (see Miller, 2019). Fol-
lowing this scholarship, we conceptualize a causal
or motivational question as asking what root cause
led the event or state from the story to happen rather
than some alternative outcome. For example, in
a story about Rover the dog, the question of why
Rover came inside is taken to mean: Why did Rover
come inside, rather than remaining where he was?4
The answer to such a question is a CAUSAL
CHAIN tracing from the root cause to the event
or state described in the story (see Figure 2 for
examples). The links in the chain walk in lock-
step through two parallel worlds: the REALIZED
WORLD, where the root cause held true and led
to the observed outcome; and an ALTERNATIVE
WORLD, where the root cause would have been
changed and led to some alternative outcome.
For mechanistic causation, each link in the chain
ends in an event that helped bring about the out-
come described in the story. For example, two
mechanistic links from Figure 2a are the plant looks
brown (rather than green) because it is unhealthy
(rather than healthy) and the plant is unhealthy
because it has little light (rather than lots of light).
For motivations, the structure is slightly different.
Rather than the final link being an event that hap-
pened in the story, it is a statement of the agent’s
preferences (in Figure 2b, Rover would prefer not
being rained on to being rained on). The links
leading to it are the future causes and effects that
the agent imagines will lead from their action to
their preferred outcome (e.g., going inside leading
to being inside leading to not getting rained on).
The causal chain provides the backbone of an
explanation for an event or action, but the full ex-
planation should recursively explain each link (e.g.,
Rover would prefer not being rained on to being
rained on). Recursive explanations appeal to some
combination of general knowledge about the world
(e.g., Most dogs prefer not to get rained on) and
4Causality as contrast may seem unintuitive, particularly
since “why” questions tend not to state a contrasting outcome.
But the audience generally just infers a reasonable default.
Beyond its support in the literature, contrast offers several
advantages. It makes it far easier to match intuitions about
what should factor into a causal explanation. It also naturally
handles relative preferences, and allows explaining multiple
aspects of an event—e.g., John walking carefully can be ex-
plained in contrast to both staying put and walking normally.
story-specific SUPPORTING FACTS—e.g., the fact
that Rover is outside. Supporting facts generally
need to be recursively explained, as well.
Even with guidelines, different annotators may
give substantively different answers. In particular,
they may drill down to different levels of detail in a
causal chain before bottoming out in general knowl-
edge—e.g., rather than stopping at dogs disliking
rain, one annotator might explain that Rover dis-
prefers rain because he dislikes getting wet, which
in turn is because dogs often dislike getting wet. To
handle such disagreements, we can adopt the pyra-
mid method (Nenkova and Passonneau, 2004) from
abstractive summarization, another task where an-
notators may provide different but equally sensible
ground truths. Under this method, a reconciler
merges RoUs into a single rubric by identifying
shared content “nuggets” (e.g., that it is raining)
and weighting each by how many annotators cited
it. (See Voorhees [2004] for more on nuggets.)
4.1.1 Preliminary notes on RoU agreement
We conducted a small pilot study on RoU annota-
tion: with the help of 5 annotators, we iteratively
crafted guidelines and tested them on 12 stories.
Here we share some initial qualitative observations.
For spatial annotations, agreement improved
when annotators first drew a simple sketch of each
scene, then translated their sketches into statements.
This process seemed to help annotators notice im-
plicit spatial facts. Some annotators also reported
that sketches lowered the cognitive burden.
For temporal annotations, annotators generally
agreed on what events took place and the temporal
relations between them. Disagreements stemmed
mainly from choices of which implicit occurrences
to annotate. We are exploring ways to promote con-
sistency, including having annotators draw time-
lines to draw attention to missing events. We are
also looking to incorporate prior art (e.g., TimeML;
Pustejovsky et al., 2003) into our guidelines.
On causal and motivational questions, we were
pleasantly surprised by the conceptual consistency
between annotators. Annotators appealed to similar
causal assertions, even bottoming out in similarly
detailed general rules. What was less consistent
was structure—how causal chains were carved into
links and how bullets were nested. Annotators also
occasionally omitted self-evident general rules or
supporting facts. We are optimistic that both issues
can be improved by more examples and training.
As expected, annotators occasionally differed on
Realized world the plant isin the bedroom
the plant has
insufficient light
the plant
is unhealthy
the plant
is brown
vs. vs. vs. vs.
Alternative world the plant issomewhere well-lit
the plant has
sufficient light
the plant
is healthy
the plant
is green
(a) A mechanistic causal chain for the question, “Why did the plant turn brown?”
Realized world Rover runs in Rover is inside
Rover does not
get rained on
Rover is
more satisfied
vs. vs. vs. vs.
Alternative world Rover stays put Rover is outside Rover gets rained on Rover is less satisfied
(b) A motivational causal chain for the question, “Why did Rover the dog run back inside when it started raining?”
Figure 2: Example causal chains answering causal (above) and motivational (below) ToU questions.
which causal contrasts to include. Such borderline
judgments of salience may be inevitable, and seem
to warrant use of the pyramid method.
4.1.2 Free-text evaluation
It is difficult to evaluate a system directly on an
RoU or a rubric, as they are written in plain English.
One option is to pose broad ToU questions (e.g.,
“What events happened and in what order?”) and
then to automatically compare systems’ full free-
text answers to annotators’. But this would require
an automated comparison metric, and existing met-
rics such as ROUGE and BLEU are concerned only
with lexical similarity. Their correlation with hu-
mans’ quality judgments is substantial but not stel-
lar (Callison-Burch et al., 2006), and high scores
do not always indicate good answers in MRC (see
Yang et al., 2018a; Nema and Khapra, 2018). Su-
perficial similarity measures may prove particularly
weak given how open-ended ToU questions are.
Alternatively, human evaluators could read both
the RoU-derived rubric and the system output and
decide whether the output adequately covers each
nugget from the rubric. This is how the pyramid
method is typically applied in summarization.
Still a third possibility is to have human evalua-
tors ask targeted questions about each nugget from
the rubric. The evaluators could then judge whether
the system’s shorter free-text answers reflect a con-
sistent understanding of that nugget. Such evalua-
tion would be especially powerful if the evaluators
knew the NLP systems’ typical shortcuts and could
reword a given question accordingly: a suspicious
evaluator could query for the same fact in multiple
ways to verify that the system consistently gets it
right. This would make results more satisfying than
many MRC evaluations, as systems couldn’t rely
on terse answers being interpreted charitably.
Of course, using humans for the final evaluation
is expensive, even if automated metrics are used
during model development. Human evaluators also
add variability and subjectivity, as they may probe
differently for the same knowledge or find a given
answer more or less convincing. Still, new tasks
often start with human evaluation while the com-
munity fine-tunes what is worth measuring, and
only later to progress to automated metrics that
approximate human judgment. Such were the tra-
jectories of topic model coherence (see Lau et al.,
2014), summarization (see Yang et al., 2016), and
machine translation (see Papineni et al., 2002), so
it is a plausible pathway for RoU evaluation, too.
4.1.3 Thorough multiple-choice evaluation
Free-response is a compelling format that is tricky
to evaluate. Multiple-choice inverts the trade-off:
it is less compelling, but much easier to evaluate.
With the help of the ToU, a multiple-choice (MC)
test can be fairly comprehensive. Question writers
would first write out RoUs for a story, and perhaps
reconcile them into a weighted rubric. They would
then write MC questions targeting each nugget in
the rubric: What goal is Rover pursuing by running
inside rather than staying put? Where was Rover
after he ran through the door? How were Rover,
the house, and the rain positioned at the end of the
story? Etc. Such a thorough MC test based on
RoUs would be a step up from current tasks.
The downside of an MC task is that, though easy
to evaluate, it would be questionable as a measure
of comprehension. All MC tasks suffer from the
same lack of naturalness: questions do not nor-
mally come with candidate answers, and ranking
candidates is simply easier than the tasks MRC
should ultimately support. Furthermore, systems
learn to exploit incidental surface features in the
question, sometimes performing well even with-
out seeing the passage (Kaushik and Lipton, 2018).
When humans take MC tests, we can make strong
assumptions about what they must know or do to
succeed; an NLP system offers no such assurances.
In the long run, then, we do not see multiple
choice as an adequate format for demonstrating
MRC. Still, such tests offer some leverage for
progress in the short term.
4.2 Approach 2: Competing to satisfy judges
The RoU guidelines put a stake in the ground as
to how ToU questions should be answered. But
as noted above, ToU questions, particularly “why”
questions, admit many good answers. The ones
canonicalized by the guidelines and by annotators
following them may not always be the most useful.
Consequently, it may prove beneficial to appeal
directly to human intuition about what understand-
ing entails. We have assumed that what lets hu-
mans perform story-related tasks is that they pos-
sess some internal answers to the ToU. If we further
assume that humans can be led to favor machine
answers that resemble their own internal ones, then
humans should make good judges of answer quality
even without the guidance of RoUs.
Accordingly, we could let humans judge sys-
tem’s full free-text answers based only on intuitive
preferences. Evaluators could still be guided to ask
ToU questions thoroughly, but extensive guidelines
would not be needed: neither asking questions nor
recognizing good answers demands nearly as much
specification as stating canonical answers.
Whereas the approaches in §4.1 must strive for
replicability in humans’ answers, this approach
seeks replicability only in humans’ judgments of
answers. We suggest two ways to achieve this.
First, in the absence of a rubric, we suspect that
answers would best be judged via pairwise compar-
isons. For free-text writing, humans generally find
comparative assessment easier than absolute scor-
ing (Pollitt, 2012), and comparison is already used
to evaluate natural-language generation (see, e.g.,
Yatskar et al., 2014). Comparisons also mitigate
the difficulty of spotting errors of omission: when
evaluators see an incomplete answer in isolation,
they may gloss over or mentally fill in what was
left unsaid. Comparing against a more complete
competing answer makes it easier to notice gaps.
Second, evaluators can be guided to tease apart
their judgments into several desirable dimensions
of explanations—e.g., accuracy, depth, and coher-
ence—just as is often done for natural language
generation. Pilot studies would be required to re-
fine the dimensions and their specifications.
5 Current MRC systems do not
comprehend stories
If current systems performed well on the ToU, our
argument would be moot. This section presents
evidence that they do not.
5.1 Data and experimental setup
To test existing systems, the questions must be
presented in a form the systems can handle. Many
systems were designed for span extraction, but the
ToU does not lend itself to answering with text
spans. Instead, we report on experiments with a
pilot version of the MC task described in §4.1.3.
To construct the test, we selected the first two
narrative stories in the dev set of RACE (Lai et al.,
2017). Based on our preliminary annotation guide-
lines, one annotator read both stories, drafted an
RoU for each, and wrote a question for each state-
ment in the rough RoUs. The annotator then col-
laborated with several others to write distractor
answers, each characterized by one or more of the
following: small surface variations on the correct
answer that change the meaning; language from the
passage, especially words that appear near words
from the question; and language that might plausi-
bly collocate with words from the question.
As an additional test for robustness, questions
came in “variant groups”: each question was paired
with a variant, or occasionally more than one, that
asks for the same information in a different way
(see Figure 3). The distractors were often altered
as well. We then evaluated accuracy in two ways:
counting each question independently and count-
ing each variant group as one unit. In the latter
method, the group is marked correct only if both
variants were answered correctly. This simulates
a suspicious evaluator re-asking the question and
deducting points if the model does not consistently
exhibit the desired understanding.
The resulting dataset contains a total of 201 ques-
tions (98 variant groups). 29% are spatial or tempo-
ral; the remaining 71% are causal or motivational.
The questions average 5.1 options, with a mini-
mum of 4. (Including many distractors somewhat
Q) What actually happened when Mr. Green and the
man drove together?
A) They came to a small house.
B) They came to a hotel.
C) They traveled around the country.
D) They stopped several times at the side of the road.
Q’) How did the man’s directions actually turn out?
A) The directions the man gave led to where the man
wanted to go.
B) The directions the man gave led to where Mr.
Green wanted to go.
C) The directions Mr. Green gave led to where the
man wanted to go.
D) The directions Mr. Green gave led to where Mr.
Green wanted to go.
Figure 3: An example variant group from our ToU-
based questions; correct answers in italics. In the asso-
ciated RACE story, a man tricks Mr. Green into driving
him home under the pretense of guiding Mr. Green to a
hotel. See Appendix B for the full story text.
mitigates the weaknesses of the MC format.) All
questions are included in the supplementary mate-
rials; Appendix B shows many examples.
For validation, the questions were presented to
two colleagues with non-technical degrees. They
scored 96% and 91% (measured on variant groups),
suggesting that motivated, well-educated humans
have little trouble with our questions.
Finally, we put the questions to XLNet (Yang
et al., 2019),5 a large, transformer-based language
model trained with generalized autoregression on
BooksCorpus and English Wikipedia. After fine-
tuning, the model achieves 81.75% on the origi-
nal RACE task (within 5 points of the best non-
ensemble model at the time of the experiments).
5.2 Results and Discussion
Our results (Table 1) show that XLNet performs
poorly. The system achieves 45% accuracy on ques-
tions and 20% on variant groups, in both settings
closing about a sixth of the gap between chance
and human performance. This strongly suggests
that whatever XLNet is doing, it is not learning
the ToU’s crucial elements of world understand-
ing. Furthermore, the system’s performance is brit-
tle, with many correct answers attributable to luck:
when moving from questions to variant groups,
human performance drops just 3 points despite a
5For questions with more than four answers, we split the
answers across multiple sub-questions, all of whose answer
sets contained the correct answer. We counted the question
correct only if that answer was chosen across all answer sets.
Chance performance was adjusted accordingly.
All By question type
Spatial +
Temporal
Causal +
Motivational
Per question 45% 35% 49%
Chance 37% 33% 38%
Human (avg.) 96% 93% 97%
Per variant group 20% 14% 23%
Chance 4% 5% 5%
Human (avg.) 93% 90% 95%
Table 1: XLNet accuracy on our ToU-based questions.
33-point drop in chance performance, whereas XL-
Net’s performance plummets by 25 points.
Although we tested only XLNet, all the other
models that currently dominate the leaderboards
are similar pre-trained language models; none has
any distinguishing characteristic that might be ex-
pected to produce dramatically better results on
our dataset. Likewise, no existing dataset is so
much more systematic than RACE that fine-tuning
on it should dramatically improve results on our
dataset. Especially given that multiple-choice tests
are artificially easy for systems (see §4.1.3), our pi-
lot experiment offers strong evidence that existing
MRC systems do not succeed on the ToU.
6 Taking the ToU idea forward
Our ToU for stories is a first attempt at defining
what MRC systems should comprehend in a princi-
pled, systematic way. Drawing on work in psychol-
ogy, philosophy, and pedagogy, we have argued for
the ToU as a minimal standard and a valuable target
for MRC. We have also shown it to be beyond the
reach of current systems.
We therefore suggest that the NLP community
further build on our ToU. This includes refining and
perhaps expanding the questions; better defining
the answers and evaluation procedures; building
MRC corpora based on the ToU; and developing
better-performing systems. We ourselves are work-
ing on all four, and we welcome collaboration.
But even beyond our ToU, the broader point
stands: existing MRC approaches are not satis-
factorily testing for a systematic set of content.
Our efforts demonstrate that it is possible, with
a sufficiently interdisciplinary approach, to define a
plausible floor for comprehension for a given class
of applications. If MRC is to achieve its ultimate
goals, we—the NLP community—owe it to our-
selves to ensure that our reading comprehension
tests actually test for the comprehension we desire.
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A Examples of applying the ToU to
stories for applications
In the main text (§3.1), we suggested that many
advanced applications hinge on understanding the
elements captured by our ToU for stories. Here we
offer several examples from two domains.
A.1 Law
For the foreseeable future, legal decision-making
will be the province of lawyers, not AI. However,
one plausible use for MRC in a legal setting is as a
screening tool for helping non-lawyers determine
whether a case has enough merit to bother bringing
in a lawyer.
For example, consider the first-person narrative
below (fictional, but based on an amalgam of sev-
eral real news stories):
My property borders on public lands
where hunting is allowed. Last month,
a hunter tracked a buck onto my prop-
erty. He claims he didn’t see my bound-
ary sign. He ended up stepping up onto
the remains of an old stone wall, which
crumbled, and he broke his wrist. Now
he’s saying I can give him $10K now and
he’ll walk away, or else he’s going to sue
me for much more.
Before contracting a lawyer, the property owner
may want to assess whether there is any merit to the
threat. On the other side of the deal, a law firm that
offers free initial consultations may wish to avoid
wasting time on cases that are clear non-starters.
A second legal application for NLU tools might
be helping a lawyer search for precedents. For
instance, a tool could help with the narrative above
(or perhaps a third-person version of it) by looking
for cases with similar elements—e.g., an accidental
trespass resulting in injury.
To assist in such application scenarios, a sys-
tem would of course need information about legal
codes. But it would also have to understand what
happened in the cases it is trying to analyze. To that
end, the answers to ToU questions would be essen-
tial, as demonstrated in Table 2. The table shows
ToU questions and answers that would be key to
understanding the landowners situation. (These
questions are ones the system would answer for
itself while reading, not necessarily questions it
would be asked by a user.)
A.2 Medicine
Medicine also offers ample opportunity for an
MRC system competent in the narrative ToU to
assist doctors and researchers. Narratives pervade
electronic health records in the form of doctors’
notes, which record information ranging from pa-
tient history to detailed descriptions of surgical
procedures.
One narrative-based medical application is help-
ing doctors understand a prior doctor’s ratio-
nale. Currently, doctors often spend time sifting
through a patient’s records to understand why a
prior doctor made a certain decision. The reason-
ing is often explained, but many documents must
be searched to find the relevant note.
For example, consider the real medical note be-
low,6 recorded after a routine follow-up appoint-
ment following breast cancer treatment:
She underwent radiation treatment end-
ing in May 2008. She then started on
Arimidex, but unfortunately she did not
tolerate the Arimidex and I changed her
to Femara. She also did not tolerate the
Femara and I changed it to tamoxifen.
She did not tolerate the tamoxifen and
therefore when I saw her on 11/23/09,
she decided that she would take no fur-
ther antiestrogen therapy. She met with
me again on 02/22/10, and decided she
wants to rechallenge herself with tamox-
ifen. When I saw her on 04/28/10, she
was really doing quite well with tamox-
ifen. She tells me 2 weeks after that visit,
she developed toxicity from the tamox-
ifen and therefore stopped it herself. She
is not going take to any further tamox-
ifen.
A future doctor may wonder why the patient is
not on hormone therapy, which would be standard
procedure. This explanatory note may be hard to
find amongst the many notes in the patient’s record.
A second medical application is finding pa-
tients who qualify for medical trials. For in-
stance, a pharmaceutical company might develop a
new anti-estrogen drug that they believe has milder
side effects. They would then want to find patients
who had already tried several anti-estrogen drugs,
6Quoted from https://www.mtsamples.com/
site/pages/sample.asp?Type=96-&Sample=
1939-Breast%20Cancer%20Followup%20-%201
Question
type
ToU question Example (partial) answer to ToU
question
Significance to legal application
Spatial Where was the
hunter when he
broke his wrist?
On the landowner’s property. The locations of events are legally
relevant in many ways. For one, property
owners may be held liable for injuries
that occur on their property. Additionally,
however, property owners may not be
liable for injuries suffered by trespassers.
Spatial
Where was the
boundary sign?
On the boundary between the public
lands and the writer’s property.
The presence of a sign may shield the
landowner from responsibility, but
recognizing that means understanding
that it would mark the boundary between
the two properties.
Temporal
When did the stone
wall fall into
disrepair?
Sometime before the story started. How long the wall has been in disrepair
may be legally relevant. Since the exact
timing was not given, the system might
flag this question for further clarification.
Temporal
Has the hunter
sued?
No, although he may do so in the future. If the hunter had already sued, the
landowner might need representation
whether or not the suit had merit.
Causal
Why did the hunter
break his wrist
(rather than his
wrist remaining
intact)?
Because he stepped onto the wall (rather
than stepping elsewhere), which led to
him falling (rather than remaining upright,
because the wall was in disrepair rather
than better condition), which led to him
breaking his wrist (rather than his wrist
remaining intact).
The wall’s disrepair was allegedly an
important causal factor in the injury,
making it more plausible that the
landowner could be held responsible.
Motivational
Why did the hunter
claim he didn’t see
a sign (rather than
saying nothing of
signs)?
He would prefer that others believe that
he entered the property unwittingly
(rather than deliberately), either because
he in fact enter unwittingly or because he
would like to deny his deliberate violation.
He believes that if he says he did not see
a sign, others will be more likely to
believe this (whereas if he says nothing,
they may assume he saw the sign).
The hunter’s claim of unwitting entry
could be motivated either by true
innocence or by deception, which affects
whether it should be believed—and
unwitting entry may be treated
differently by the law. The system may
want to flag this claim for follow-up
questions about its plausibility.
Causal
Why did the hunter
enter the private
property (rather
than stopping at the
boundary)?
Possibly because the hunter didn’t see the
sign (rather than seeing it), so he
remained unaware he was crossing the
boundary (rather than realizing he was).
There may be a mechanistic
(non-motivational) explanation for why
the hunter did not stop at the boundary,
and again, unintentional entry may be
legally different. Also, the landowner
may have been responsible for posting
signs that would keep people away from
his property if there were any hazards.
Motivational
(recursive
explana-
tion for the
end of the
previous
causal
chain)
Why might being
aware of the
boundary have
made the hunter
stop, whereas being
unaware of it (may
have) led him to
cross it?
The hunter likely prefers staying within
the law to violating it. If he had known he
was at the boundary of private property,
he would have known that continuing
past the boundary would be illegal
trespass, but not knowing about the
boundary meant he did not know
continuing could be trespassing.
The hunter suggested that missing the
sign led to accidentally entering the
property, but that claim hinges on the
assumption that had he known about the
property line, he would have respected it.
That may be a challengeable assumption.
Motivational
Why did the hunter
threaten to sue,
rather than suing
immediately?
The hunter would prefer to get less
money than to possibly get more money
but experience the hassle of a lawsuit and
risk getting nothing. He believed that if
he threatened, the property owner might
be afraid of losing more money and give
him the $10,000 (whereas if the hunter
sued immediately he would have no
chance to avoid the hassle and risk).
It is possible that the very act of extorting
money via a threat of a lawsuit has legal
implications. Also, this action by the
hunter may indicate that he considers the
risk of losing the case high or that he is
otherwise reluctant to pursue a lawsuit,
which may affect what course of action
the landowner ultimately wants to take.
Table 2: Example ToU questions and answers for a legal application.
Question
type
ToU
question
Example (partial) answer to ToU
question
Significance to medical application
Temporal When did
the patient
start and
stop taking
tamoxifen?
Multiple times: She started taking it
sometime after May 2008 and
stopped taking it by 11/23/09. Then,
she started taking it again on
02/22/10, and stopped taking it by
mid-May 2010.
A clinical trial may be seeking patients who kept
stopping and starting a specific drug. It may also be
important how long the side effects took to develop.
Also note that if the question of interest is really a
counting question (how many times), this relies
most of all on an underlying temporal understanding
like the one captured by the ToU.
Causal/
Motivational
Why is the
patient not
taking an
anti-
estrogen
drug (rather
than taking
one)?
She was taking Arimidex, and it
caused strong side effects (rather than
her having mild or no side effects).
Preferring fewer side effects, she
therefore tried Femara (rather than
continuing with Arimidex). Femara
also caused side effects, so for the
same reasons as before, she tried
switching to tamoxifen (rather than
continuing the Femara), but it also
caused side effects. The patient
preferred not experiencing the side
effects to having the medical benefits
of the drugs, so she decided not to
take any such drug (rather than
continuing with one of the above).
A future doctor may expect the patient to be on an
anti-estrogen drug, as that is standard for someone
with her history of breast cancer. Understanding that
the patient has tried many drugs and decided to stop
them may inform the doctors course of action. The
doctor might proceed differently if he determined
that she had stopped for some other reasone.g., that
she simply lapsed in a prescription.
Also, a clinical trial may be seeking patients who
stopped taking a drug because of side effects.
Furthermore, the trial might be seeking specifically
patients who stopped taking the drug at the advice of
the doctor.
Table 3: Example ToU questions and answers for a medical application.
perhaps multiple times, and had toxicity problems
with all of them. Currently, research hospitals find
patients for a given clinical trial by employing hu-
mans to read through the hospital’s database of
medical notes and determine which patients meet
the trial’s criteria.
To assist in such application scenarios, an auto-
mated system would have to understand medical
notes like the one above. In the rationale-finding
application, it would have to interpret the note well
enough to recognize that it explains the current
medical regimen; in the patient-finding application,
the system would have to recognize that this pa-
tient went on and off of several anti-estrogen drugs
because of side effects. Again, understanding the
answers to ToU questions would be essential, as
demonstrated in Table 3.
B Example ToU-based multiple-choice
questions on a RACE story
B.1 The story
Mr. Green was traveling around the country in his
car. One evening he was driving along a road and
looking for a small hotel when he saw an old man
at the side of the road. He stopped his car and said
to the old man, “I want to go to the Sun Hotel. Do
you know it?”
“Yes.” The old man answered. “I’ll show you
the way.”
He got into Mr. Green’s car and they drove for
about twelve miles. When they came to a small
house, the old man said, “Stop here.”
Mr. Green stopped and looked at the house. “But
this isn’t a hotel.” He said to the old man.
“No,” the old man answered, “This is my house.
And now I’ll show you the way to the Sun Hotel.
Turn around and go back nine miles. Then you’ll
see the Sun Hotel on the left.”
B.2 RACE’s original questions
Answers marked correct by RACE are italicized.
Q1. Where did Mr. Green want to sleep that night?
A) In his car.
B) In his own house.
C) In a hotel.
D) In the old man’s house.
Q2. Why did Mr. Green stop his car?
A) Because he found a hotel.
B) Because the lights were red.
C) Because he saw an old man.
D) Because he saw a friend.
Q3. Where did the old man promise to take Mr.
Green?
A) To Mr. Green’s house.
B) To the old man’s house.
C) To the SunHotel. [sic]
D) To the country.
Q4. Why didn’t the old man stop Mr. Green when
they passed the hotel?
A) Because he wanted Mr. Green to sleep in his
house.
B) Because he wanted to get home.
C) Because he didn’t see the hotel.
D) Because he didn’t know the hotel.
Q5. How far was it from the place where Mr. Green
met the old man to the Sun Hotel?
A) About nine miles.
B) About three miles.
C) About twenty-one miles.
D) About twelve miles.
B.3 A sampling of our ToU-based questions
Correct answers are italicized. Questions are num-
bered with the IDs used in our dataset, which
is available in this paper’s supplementary data.
The first number in each question ID indicates
the variant group; the second number is a group-
independent question index.
B.3.1 Causal chains
The questions below target different parts of causal
chains explaining why the agents in the story took
the actions that they did. The first five ask about
why Mr. Green stopped his car (vs. continuing to
drive); the next five ask about why the old man said
he would show Mr. Green the way (vs. just giving
him directions).
Q1-1. Why did Mr. Green stop his car the first
time?
A) Because if he stopped his car, he could ask the
man something.
B) Because if he stopped his car, he could make
a new friend.
C) Because if he stopped his car, the old man
could get in.
D) Because the directions he asked for said to
stop the car.
E) Because if he stopped his car, he could drive
for about twelve more miles.
F) Because he got a flat tire.
G) Because he was driving along a road.
H) Because he was traveling around the country.
I) Because he said, “I want to go to the Sun
Hotel”.
Q2-3. Why did Mr. Green want to ask the man
something?
A) Because there was something he didn’t know.
B) Because he liked to ask questions.
C) Because there was a chance to make a friend.
D) Because he didn’t want to drive past the man
without helping him.
E) Because if he stopped his car, he could drive
for about twelve miles.
F) Because he got a flat tire.
G) Because he was driving along a road.
H) Because he said, “I want to go to the Sun
Hotel”.
Q3-7. Before they spoke at all, what did Mr. Green
hope the man would be able to do?
A) Tell him where the hotel was.
B) Tell him where the small house was.
C) Get in his car.
D) Drive for about twelve miles.
E) Take him to his house.
F) Take him to the hotel.
G) See an old man.
Q4-9. What did Mr. Green hope the conversation
with the old man would enable him to do?
A) Get where he was going
B) Travel around the country
C) See what he was seeing
D) Stop and look at a house
E) Drive with the old man
F) Come to a small house
G) Turn around and go back
Q5-11. What was Mr. Green trying to do through-
out the story?
A) To stay at the small hotel
B) To drive along a road
C) To pass the small hotel
D) To come to a small house
E) To see the old man
F) To stop at the side of the road
G) To speak with the old man
Q6-12. Why did the old man make his initial offer
to Mr. Green?
A) The old man was appearing to help Mr. Green
while actually tricking him.
B) The old man was appearing to trick Mr. Green
while actually helping him.
C) Mr. Green was appearing to help the old man
while actually tricking him.
D) Mr. Green was appearing to trick the old man
while actually helping him.
Q7-14. Why did the old man say he would show
Mr. Green the way instead of just giving directions?
A) So Mr. Green would let him into his car.
B) So Mr. Green would stop his car.
C) So Mr. Green would say something to the old
man.
D) So he could answer Mr. Green.
E) So they could go to the hotel.
F) So Mr. Green would take him to the hotel.
Q10-20. Where did the old man expect he and Mr.
Green would drive together to?
A) The house
B) The Sun Hotel
C) The side of the road
D) Back nine miles
Q11-22. Why did the man want to ride with Mr.
Green?
A) He wanted to get home.
B) He wanted to get to the hotel.
C) He wanted to stand at the side of the road.
D) He wanted to answer Mr. Green.
E) He wanted to get into Mr. Green’s car.
Q13-26. What is one reason the man’s plan
worked?
A) Mr. Green wouldn’t know where they were
really going.
B) Mr. Green wouldn’t know what his name re-
ally was.
C) Mr. Green wouldn’t know how old he really
was.
D) He wanted to see the hotel on the left.
E) He showed Mr. Green the way to the hotel.
B.3.2 General knowledge
For causal and motivational questions, an RoU of-
ten includes abstract general knowledge. To inter-
rogate these components of understanding, we we
wrote questions where the answer choices do not
mention any of the entities in the story. Below are
general knowledge questions that target the same
two events as the questions immediately above.
While we thought these questions might be espe-
cially difficult, XLNet handled them about as well
as the causal/motivational questions whose answer
choices explicitly mentioned story entities.
Q21-44. What is part of the reason why Mr. Green
stopped driving when he first saw the man?
A) In order to ask someone a question, you have
to be close to them.
B) In order to get where you’re going, you need
to stop your car.
C) When you travel around the country, you stop
your car.
D) When the evening arrives, you drive your car
home.
E) When you’re looking for a hotel, you often
stop your car.
F) People often pick up hitchhikers.
G) People often stop to help others.
Q22-47. Why did Mr. Green think the man on the
side of the road might be able to help him?
A) Often a person in a given area is familiar with
the geography of that area.
B) Often a person in a given area gives out useful
items.
C) Often one person can give a ride to another
person.
D) Often a person on the side of the road needs
help.
Q23-48. Why did Mr. Green want to know where
the hotel was?
A) Getting to a place usually requires knowing
where the place is.
B) Driving around the country usually requires
knowing where you are.
C) Talking with a person usually requires seeing
where they are.
D) Getting into a car usually requires knowing
where the car is.
Q24-51. Why was Mr. Green seeking the old man’s
help in the first place?
A) People like to sleep comfortably at night.
B) People like to travel in a leisurely manner
around the country.
C) People like to talk amiably with each other.
D) People like to see interesting sights on the
road.
E) People like to be driven directly to their
homes.
Q25-52. Why did the old man say he would show
Mr. Green the way, the first time?
A) People sometimes trick others for their own
gain.
B) People sometimes trick others in order to help
them.
C) People sometimes help others for selfless rea-
sons.
D) People sometimes help others for selfish rea-
sons.
Q26-54. Why did the old man first say he would
show Mr. Green the way instead of just giving di-
rections?
A) To show someone the way means going along
with them whereas giving directions means
just telling them information.
B) To show someone the way means just giving
them information whereas giving directions
means going along with them.
C) Giving directions is more effective than show-
ing someone the way.
D) Giving directions is less effective than show-
ing someone the way.
E) Giving directions is more friendly than show-
ing someone the way.
F) Giving directions is less friendly than showing
someone the way.
Q28-58. Why did the old man expect to be able to
control the route as he rode with Mr. Green?
A) When taking directions, people generally go
where they are told to go.
B) When taking directions, people usually go
somewhere other than where they are told to
go.
C) When on vacation, people generally follow
their itineraries.
D) When driving with strangers, people are gen-
erally very careful.
E) When going to a small house, people generally
ride together.
Q29-60. What helps explain why the man wanted
to accompany Mr. Green on his drive?
A) People usually want to go home at night.
B) People usually want to go to a hotel at night.
C) People usually want to travel around the coun-
try.
D) People usually want to drive with each other.
Q30-62. Why did the old man trick Mr. Green?
A) Being driven home by someone is nice and
convenient.
B) Traveling around the country with someone is
fun and exciting.
C) Stopping and looking at someone’s house is
interesting and enjoyable.
D) Answering someone’s questions is fulfilling
and helpful.
Q31-64. What is one reason the man’s plan
worked?
A) If someone is unfamiliar with an area, they
won’t realize if they’re going the wrong way.
B) If someone is familiar with an area, they won’t
realize if they’re going the wrong way.
C) If someone is unfamiliar with an area, they
will realize if they’re going the wrong way.
D) If someone is traveling around the country by
car, they will drive an old man’s home.
E) If someone wants to go to a hotel, they will
go to a small house first.
B.3.3 Spatio-temporal questions
The questions below target the spatial and temporal
information in the story, asking how things were
physically arranged at different points in time.
Q37-76. Who was in the car at first?
A) Mr. Green
B) Both Mr. Green and the old man
C) The old man
D) Neither Mr. Green nor the old man
Q38-78. Who was in the car when Mr. Green drove
to the small house?
A) Both Mr. Green and the old man
B) Mr. Green
C) The old man
D) Neither Mr. Green nor the old man
Q39-80. Who was probably in the car when Mr.
Green drove away from the small house?
A) Mr. Green
B) Both Mr. Green and the old man
C) The old man
D) Neither Mr. Green nor the old man
Q40-82. Who was at the small house at first?
A) Neither Mr. Green nor the old man
B) Mr. Green
C) Both Mr. Green and the old man
D) The old man
Q41-84. Who was at the small house when Mr.
Green arrived there?
A) Both Mr. Green and the old man
B) Mr. Green
C) The old man
D) Neither Mr. Green nor the old man
Q42-86. Who was likely at the small house a short
while after the story ends?
A) The old man
B) Mr. Green
C) Both Mr. Green and the old man
D) Neither Mr. Green nor the old man
Q53-109. When driving to the old man’s, on which
side did they pass the hotel?
A) The car passed the hotel on the right side of
the road
B) The car passed the hotel on the left side of the
road
C) The car passed the house on the left side of
the road
D) The car passed the house on the right side of
the road
Q54-111. How were Mr. Green, the car, the old
man, and the window probably situated when Mr.
Green stopped to ask the man a question?
A) Mr. Green in the car, the window down, the
man on the side of the road
B) Mr. Green in the car, the window down, the
man in the car
C) Mr. Green in the car, the window up, the man
on the side of the road
D) Mr. Green in the car, the window up, the man
in the car
E) Mr. Green out of the car, the window down,
the man in the car
F) Mr. Green out of the car, the window up, the
man in the car
Q55-113. While the two men drove to the old
man’s house, how was the scene likely arranged?
A) Mr. Green and the man next to each other, in
the car
B) The man next to Mr. Green next to the car
C) The car in the man and Mr. Green
D) Mr. Green next to the man next to the car
E) The man at his house and Mr. Green in the car
F) Mr. Green at the hotel and the man at his house
G) Mr. Green at his house and the man at the
hotel
Q56-115. When Mr. Green was actually going
the right way at the end, how was the scene likely
arranged?
A) The man at his house and Mr. Green in the
car
B) Mr. Green and the man next to each other, in
the car
C) The man next to Mr. Green next to the car
D) The car in the man and Mr. Green
E) Mr. Green next to the man next to the car
F) Mr. Green at the hotel and the man at his house
G) Mr. Green at his house and the man at the
hotel
B.3.4 More variant groups
As described in the paper, for each question we
wrote a second version that targeted essentially the
same information in a different way. Below are
additional examples of such variant groups.
Q19-39. Why could Mr. Green still help the man
by showing him the way at the end of the story?
A) Mr. Green still didn’t know how to get to the
hotel.
B) Mr. Green still didn’t know that he was at the
man’s house.
C) Mr. Green was still looking at the house.
D) The old man knew where Mr. Green’s car was.
Q19-40. What information was Mr. Green missing
that the man provided when he showed him the
way the second time?
A) Mr. Green didn’t know how to get to the hotel.
B) Mr. Green didn’t know that he was at the old
man’s house.
C) Mr. Green didn’t know who the old man was.
D) The old man knew where Mr. Green’s car was.
Q46-94. Who was in the car just before Mr. Green
met the old man?
A) Mr. Green
B) Both Mr. Green and the old man
C) The old man
D) Neither Mr. Green nor the old man
Q46-95. Who was in the car when Mr. Green ap-
proached the spot where he met the old man?
A) Mr. Green
B) Both Mr. Green and the old man
C) The old man
D) Neither Mr. Green nor the old man
Q22-45. Why did Mr. Green want to speak to the
old man?
A) People ask questions when they lack informa-
tion.
B) People are interested in the places they travel.
C) People are often very curious.
D) Old men at the side of the road sometimes
know the future.
E) People ask questions before letting people into
their cars.
F) People interrogate hitchhikers before picking
them up.
Q22-46. Why did Mr. Green think the old man
might be able to help him?
A) Sometimes one person has information an-
other person doesn’t.
B) Sometimes one person trades a car for another
person’s house.
C) Sometimes one person gives a ride to another
person.
D) Sometimes one person on the side of the road
gets in another person’s car.
